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EDITORIAL
In the issue of March, 1930, The Jour­
nal of Accountancy discussed at 
some length a decision then recently
handed down by Justice Holmes of the supreme court of the 
United States in the case of the Haberle Crystal Springs 
Brewing Company. This was an income-tax case, and the 
court decided that the taxpayer was not entitled in computing 
its taxable net income in the years 1918 and 1919 to a deduc­
tion for obsolescence of its goodwill resulting from the adoption 
of the eighteenth amendment. In this case the amount of 
the deduction was not at issue. The amount had been legally 
established, if any deduction whatever was to be allowed. The 
government contended that the revenue act of 1918 intended to 
allow for the exhaustion, wear and tear and obsolescence of prop­
erty of such a nature that it was decreased, consumed or disposed 
of by use in the trade or business, and that goodwill is not such 
property. The court in its decision did not refer to the govern­
ment’s contention but decided against the taxpayer on the 
ground that the words “exhaustion” and “obsolescence” did 
not apply when a business was terminated by law as an evil, and 
that to make such an allowance would be to grant part compen­
sation to the taxpayer for the extinguishment of his business by 
law in the form of an abatement of taxes otherwise due, and that 
it was incredible that congress should have intended such a result. 
The effect of this decision was to reverse, upon a point which had 
never been urged or argued before the court, a practice which had 
been followed by the government since 1919 and in accordance 
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could arise as a result of the prohibition amendment had been 
settled and the tax paid. Aside from this practical aspect of 
the matter, the decision has not commanded the universal respect 
that we should wish for the decisions of our highest court.
Supreme Court Now 
Allows Deduction
Now the supreme court has handed 
down a decision, in V. Loewers Gam- 
brinus Brewery Company v. Charles W.
Anderson (U. S. supreme court, No. 352, February 24,1931), which 
confirms the right of the taxpayer in calculating its taxes for 1918 
and 1919 to deduct an allowance “for obsolescence of its buildings 
resulting from the imminence and taking effect of the prohibitory 
laws.” In its decision in this case, which is one of three some­
what similar cases decided at the same time, the court endeavors
to distinguish between obsolescence of tangible and intangible 
property, although the language of the revenue act of 1918 [sec­
tion 234 (a)] speaks only of “property used in the trade or busi­
ness.” It is satisfactory to note in this decision that the supreme 
court definitely affirms the ruling of the treasury, which allowed 
taxpayers engaged in brewing, distilling, etc., when computing 
their taxable net income to spread their allowance for obsolescence 
due to prohibition over the period from the date when the 
imminence of prohibition became definitely known until prohi­
bition became effective; that is, the period between January 31, 
1918, and January 16, 1920. The court also recognized that 
there is nothing in the language of the statute—that is, the revenue 
act of 1918—or the circumstances of its enactment to suggest that 
congress intended that the taxable incomes of brewers should 
not be determined according to the rules that govern taxable 
incomes of others. The court also states: ‘‘ None of the acts made
any classification based on the causes from which obsolescence 
results. And, as the sole purpose is to arrive at the net income 
subject to taxation, it is clear that such a discrimination could 
not reasonably or justly be made.”
Comparison with 
Earlier Decision
The language of the Gambrinus decision 
gives considerable ground for a belief 
that should a case now arise presenting a
claim for allowance of the exhaustion or obsolescence of intangi­
ble property, the court would find difficulty in refusing a decision 
in favor of the taxpayer. Let us suppose, for instance, that in the 
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year 1914 a brewing or a distillery company had paid the sum of 
$1,000,000 for a trade name, a trade brand or a process. Fol­
lowing the language of the 1918 statute there would seem to be 
no doubt that through this transaction the corporation would 
have acquired “property” and that that property would have 
been destroyed by the prohibition legislation. Under the ordi­
nary rules for computing taxable net income the loss on property 
can be deducted in the year in which the exhaustion or obsoles­
cence occurs, and the supreme court now confirms the treasury 
rule adopted in 1919 allowing taxpayers whose property is 
destroyed by prohibition legislation to spread this deduction 
over a total period of nearly two years. The Haberle Crystal 
Springs case involved goodwill rather than a trade name, brand 
or process, but had a company in the year 1914 paid a substan­
tial sum for the goodwill of the Haberle Crystal Springs 
Brewing Company, it would seem to the lay mind that the 
taxpayer would be entitled to deduct the amount which 
it actually paid in the purchase of such property. In the Gam- 
brinus case the court has cleared away some difficulties and has 
supported the treasury ruling under which, as already stated, a 
large majority of the possible cases arising under prohibition 
legislation has been settled. Its decision, however, seems to entail 
a conflict with the court’s own decision in the Haberle Crystal 
Springs case. It has decided that the allowable deduction for 
exhaustion or obsolescence of intangible properties may be spread 
over a period during which the coming into effect of prohibition 
was definitely known. The statute uses the word “property” 
without any qualification. The Haberle Crystal Springs case 
did not deny a deduction for obsolescence on the ground that the 
property in that case was an intangible property. What position 
the court would take in a new case presenting squarely the issue 
of the exhaustion or obsolescence of intangible property is an 
interesting speculation.
Since publication of an editorial note 
in the March issue of The Journal of 
Accountancy upon the subject of com­
petitive bidding for accounting engagements, several letters have 
been received from correspondents agreeing and some disagreeing 
with the policy expressed. Those who feel that the position taken 
was wrong base their contention upon the statement that it seems
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to be impossible to obtain certain kinds of engagements in any 
other way. For example, in some places it is the custom, possibly 
even the law, to call for bids for the audit of savings banks and 
similar institutions. Consequently, say the correspondents, the 
accountant is compelled to bid and it is useless to oppose what is 
compulsory. That is strange logic. What we were trying to say 
in the earlier comment was that if accountants would refrain 
from bidding a wiser method would have to be evolved. Suppose 
it is the law that there shall be bids for the audit of a savings 
bank and suppose that no one bids—what then? No ac­
countant really feels that bidding is satisfactory, especially if it is 
bidding a flat fee. As we have said repeatedly the chances of 
bidding a flat fee which will be exactly fair are so remote as to be 
out of the range of vision. If the bid is too low the accountant 
loses, and if it is too high the client loses, and it is certain to be 
either too low or too high. Consequently we find that it must be 
unfair to some one and, being unfair, we fail to see how anyone 
can defend it.
Another basis of opposition to the view 
which we have expressed is described 
as the "local conditions." One account­
ant writes:
“You must remember that in this territory an amount over­
whelmingly in excess of one-half of the business is in the hands 
of accountants who have no professional affiliation and have no 
compunctions about competitive bidding. I had one personal 
experience this winter. Having performed the work in 1930, I 
was willing to make a flat bid of $1000, but at the same time I had 
a feeling that it would take careful management to make the reg­
ular rates at that price. One of the firms to which I allude se­
cured the work on a bid of $600. I believe it may become neces­
sary for the council to suspend certain of the rules in designated 
territories, in order that members may compete with non-mem- 
bers with a fair chance of success.”
Those are noble sentiments. Because there are conditions in 
some parts of the country which afflict the reputable accountant 
and because unprofessional practices may seem profitable in 
those districts, our correspondent seems to advocate the abandon­
ment of decency for participation in a free-for-all fight. The 
man who wrote that letter does not really mean what he says and 
he would not be guilty of doing half the things he threatens to do,
244
The Plea of 
Competition
Editorial
but his remarks are interesting if only for the purpose of discus­
sion. Carried to their extreme his views would involve the break­
ing down of all law, all morals, all civilization. If there is no 
higher guiding principle than jungle law why should we struggle 
upward? If the public interest is sacrificed to personal desire, 
avarice, lust or hate is that a reason why all should follow? Is it 
not rather the most potent reason why all should not follow? If 
there are so-called accountants who do reprehensible things, is 
that to be the standard of the profession? Of course it is easy to 
generalize and it must be admitted that the competitive tactics of 
accountants who would compete are distressing, but it is im­
possible to avoid a feeling that the man who has not sufficient 
backbone and inherent ability to succeed even in the face of 
competition and low practices is in the wrong vocation. The 
profession as a whole marches upward and the man who wrote 
the letter which we are discussing would fight furiously if anyone 
should suggest that he fall out of line.
A reader, who has been studying rates of 
depreciation of physical assets, has been 
considerably disturbed by the sub­
stantial difference which he has found in what he calls the 
theoretical depreciation compared with the actual extent of de­
preciation based upon appraisal. For example he points to a 
circular issued by an appraisal company containing a statement of 
depreciation of machinery at fifteen years’ life shown theoretically 
as fifty per cent. but by appraisal as only thirty per cent. There 
are other comparisons somewhat similar, and our correspondent 
feels that there may be serious misunderstanding of the compara­
tive values of theoretical and actual depreciation. Now, as a 
matter of fact, there will always be a wide difference of opinion as 
to the valuation of any wasting asset at any given time. For 
example, one may buy a piece of machinery estimated to have a 
life of twenty years. During that period of twenty years there 
may be no change in mechanics which will tend to render obsolete 
the machinery in question. By extraordinary care the machinery 
may be maintained in absolutely sound condition. The market 
prices of machinery may advance. In such circumstances an ap­
praisal of the machinery at the end of twenty years might show 
that there had been no depreciation whatever—and it is conceivable 
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Is such an extraordinary incident to invalidate the theory of 
depreciation? It is absolutely ridiculous to attempt to lay down 
a uniform rate of depreciation which will apply fairly to every 
piece of machinery in the world. So-called actual depreciation is, 
therefore, merely the decline in value of one item during a given 
period, and it may or may not serve as an index to the average 
depreciation of all such items. Theoretical depreciation, on the 
other hand, is a composite of the estimated decline in value of a 
number of articles of similar nature. It is, of course, never ac­
curate, or if it be accurate no one can know it. We should regard 
it as most unhealthy for any company engaged in an industry 
involving the use of machinery, for example, to base its estimate of 
depreciation upon a condition reported by another concern rather 
than upon a general line of depreciation found to be close to the 
average. Certainly it would be bad accounting to carry such 
sensitive assets as machinery in the books at a figure substantially 
higher than the theoretical value determined as a result of experi­
ence in many plants. Every owner of wasting assets knows the 
temptation to over-valuation. When a bad year comes—for in­
stance such a year as 1930—it is very easy to say, “ Really we have 
been writing off too much depreciation in past years and we 
shall omit any reserve or allowance this time.” That is self-decep­
tion which may lead to disaster. More businesses have gone to 
the wall because of failure to recognize depreciation than for any 
other reason. Depreciation in times of depression is bitter 
medicine but good for one’s soul.
The United States Daily in its issue of 
January 30, 1931, reports a decision 
of the supreme court of Delaware in a 
case involving the payment of accrued preferred dividends on dis­
solution of a company. The case is of peculiar interest because 
of the questions of rights involved. In the opinion of the court 
it was stated: “The company having been organized a number of 
years had both common and preferred stock outstanding. The 
company had not been successful and at no time had there been 
any net profits arising from its operation nor at any time did it 
have a surplus over capital and liabilities.’’ Of the three ques­
tions presented in the appeal, most important is the third which 
the court describes as follows: “In dissolution proceedings where 
there was not and never had been any surplus or net profits, can
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unpaid dividends on preferred stock, agreed to be cumulative, be 
given preference to payments on common stock in addition to 
the preference of the par value of the stock?” Article four of 
the certificate of incorporation provided as follows: “In the event 
of any liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the corporation, 
or upon any distribution of its capital, other than the redemp­
tion of its preferred stock, the holders of the preferred stock shall 
be entitled to be paid in full the par value thereof and all unpaid 
dividends accrued thereon, before any amount shall be paid or 
any assets distributed to the holders of the common shares, and, 
after the payment to the holders of the preferred stock of the 
amount payable to them as hereinbefore provided, the remaining 
assets and funds of the corporation shall be divided and paid to 
the holders of the common shares according to their respective 
shares.”
The opinion of the court reads in part as follows:
“We shall now address ourselves to the remaining and more 
important question presented by this appeal. This question is, 
in brief: Are the preferred stockholders entitled, in dissolution 
proceedings, to a preference in the payment of dividends in addi­
tion to the par value of the preferred stock where the assets of the 
company do not include profits from its management?
“ If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the further 
question then arises: To what point of time are the unpaid divi­
dends computed? The chancellor determined that since no 
profits or surplus existed, no dividends on the preferred stock 
could have accrued, and, therefore, no unpaid dividends could 
be given preference in the dissolution proceedings. The remain­
ing question as to the computation of the time of preference of 
such unpaid dividends was, of course, not considered by him.
“This court does not agree with the conclusion reached by 
the chancellor, and in view of the importance of the ques­
tion with relation to the corporate structures under the laws 
of this state, we have given the matter both serious and special 
consideration.
“The consideration of the rights of holders of preferred stock 
of the corporation in question to dividends is largely covered by 
paragraphs (a) and (e) of the articles of the certificate of incor­
poration. These paragraphs cover fields entirely different. 
Paragraph (a) treats solely of the rights of preferred stockholders 
to dividends while the company is a going concern. Of course, 
the right to dividends in such a case depends upon the existence 
of surplus or net profits. This requirement is not only expressly 
set out in paragraph (a), but is also fundamental in the law of 
corporations.
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“Paragraph (e), however, has no relation to the company as a 
going concern; it contemplates only the relation of stockholders 
inter se after all creditors have been paid and the remaining assets 
of the corporation are distributable to the stockholders. There 
is no legal requirement aside from contract as set out in the certifi­
cate of incorporation that in dissolution proceedings accumulated 
dividends could only be preferred from surplus or profits.
“In other words, it is universally conceded that the certificate 
of incorporation could provide, if it was clearly and unequivocally 
therein stated, that in dissolution proceedings the holders of 
preferred stock would be entitled to a preference of accumulated 
unpaid dividends before payments to common stockholders even 
though no surplus or profits existed. It is, therefore, true that the 
non-existence of profits creates no legal barrier to the preference 
of dividends in dissolution proceedings.
“The question is then one solely of contract between the stock­
holders. What did the stockholders mean when, in contemplat­
ing dissolution proceedings, after the payment of debts, they 
stipulated that the preferred stockholders should have a return of 
the par value of their stock together with unpaid dividends 
accrued thereon?
“We are, . . . , of the opinion that in the present case the 
holders of the cumulative preferred stock are entitled in the 
liquidation proceedings to be paid in addition to the par value 
of their stock the unpaid dividends accrued thereon.
“The question then arises: To what point are these dividends 
payable? Are they payable to the time of the appointment of 
the receiver or down to the time of distribution?
“We are clearly of the opinion that it was only contemplated 
that the preferred stock would be entitled to dividends while the 
company was a going and active concern and while it was possible 
to produce that fund from which it was originally thought the 
dividends would be paid, viz., the surplus and profits of the com­
pany. No dividends could have been contemplated as becoming 
due after the company ceased to have any profits from its man­
agement, and when the management itself was taken from the 
officers and vested in the court through the instrumentality of the 
receiver then the liability for dividends ceased. (Drewry-Hughes 
Co. v. Throckmorton; Johnson v. Johnson & Briggs; In re Creditors 
Oil Co., L. R. 1902, 2 Ch. 86).”
Every year the question of the use and 
destination of an accountant’s report 
becomes increasingly important. In 
far too many cases the accountant seems to feel that having 
delivered his report he may wash his hands of the whole matter 
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and let the use of the report depend upon the whim of the client. 
Possibly under a strictly legal definition of duty it is not neces­
sary for the accountant to give any consideration at all to what 
the client or any other person may do with his report when it has 
been rendered and payment for it has been made, but that is a 
narrow view and one which may lead to serious injury to client, 
accountant and banker. The accountant may say that he is not 
concerned with any misuse, but that is not true. He is concerned 
deeply. The case is admirably summarized in the following 
letter from a member of the American Institute of Accountants 
addressed to that organization:
"Among my clients there are several who desire an account­
ing service consisting of only the preparation of periodical reports 
from their books, advice concerning accounting problems asap- 
plied to their business and the preparation of various tax returns. 
I assume that other accountants also have clients who desire nei­
ther a balance-sheet nor complete audit, and who would, there­
fore, fall in the same general class.
"When rendering a report on an engagement of this nature, the 
qualification ‘This balance-sheet is subject to the accompanying 
comments ’ is always stated upon the balance-sheet itself, and the 
comments include the following sentence:
‘“In accordance with the terms of my engagement, no audit of 
the accounts or verification of assets has been made.’
“Of course a report of this kind is not certified.
“Many clients falling in this class borrow at various banks and 
are requested to file financial statements showing their condition. 
These statements are usually prepared by the clients on the 
bank’s own form. Many of these forms contain the query, ‘Are 
your books audited by a C. P. A. ? If so, by whom and as of what 
date?’
“On repeat engagements of the type mentioned, I have on oc­
casions seen, among papers submitted to me, a copy of such a 
financial statement made to the banks and found in some cases 
that the client had answered the question regarding audit in the 
affirmative, giving my name as being the auditor, despite the 
qualification contained in my report. Usually these statements 
agree with the balance-sheet prepared by me from the books of 
account.
“While this condition is far from being ideal, I have always 
felt that if the banks accepted the client’s statement without re­
questing a signed copy of the auditor’s report, the negligence was 
on their part.
“However, I have found on a recent engagement, that a state­
ment prepared by my client and filed at the bank with the above 
query answered in the affirmative showed amounts greatly in
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excess of the figures submitted in my unaudited report. For in­
stance, the inventory was stated to the bank at about $56,000 
more than the inventory as per the books of my client, and a con­
siderable amount of real estate owned by the proprietor but not 
recorded on the books was also shown in the financial statement. 
The bank to which this statement was sent is one of the largest 
financial institutions in an adjoining county, and, so far as I know, 
has accepted the statement for credit purposes, since it is extend­
ing the client a line of credit, relying possibly on the statement 
therein contained that the books have been audited by me.
“Such a condition is certainly unfavorable to the auditor, and 
the cooperation of the banks should be sought to end such an un­
fair practice on the part of fraudulent clients.
“What redress has an accountant in a case of this kind, and 
what are the steps that can be taken to prevent its recurrence? 
It seems to me that if the banks in every case in which they re­
ceive a financial statement purporting to have been audited by a 
C. P. A. would insist upon receiving a signed copy of the account­
ant’s report it would certainly be to their advantage and would 
also be very desirable from the accountant’s viewpoint for his pro­
tection.
“I can not, I assume, go to the bankers in question and tell 
them that their customer has filed a fraudulent statement. Never­
theless, if this client meets with financial difficulty and the bank­
ers suffer a loss, they would undoubtedly look with suspicion on 
any balance-sheets which may be submitted to them in the future, 
bearing my certificate, as I have no doubt they are under the im­
pression that the figures contained in the financial statement they 
are using for credit purposes are authentic and prepared by me.
“This is a question which I think warrants the Institute’s at­
tention and I raise it for discussion because of the particular case 
cited, at the same time seeking advice as to what might be done 
to protect my own reputation. Would I be justified, in the cir­
cumstances, in writing to all bankers in this vicinity advising 
them that in all cases in which they receive statements from their 
clients which contain my name as auditor, I disclaim responsi­
bility unless signed by me, or unless a copy of my report covering 
the engagement in question is duly signed and filed with them?”
The correspondent asks what can be 
done to prevent such fraudulent prac­
tices as that of which he complains. 
It seems that there are several things which can be done. In 
the first place, if the accountant has the slightest reason to believe 
that his client is one who would be guilty of perpetrating such a 
crime as that which he describes, he should refuse the client’s 
work. Any borrower who would present a fraudulent statement
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to a bank is a bad client. Every bad client, even if he pays his 
bill, is a serious liability to the accountant. Without going 
into the question of law it certainly appears that the courts would 
have jurisdiction over a man who would commit such an inten­
tional wrong. There has been far too much tendency to play 
fast and loose with accountants’ reports. In some cases they 
have been actually distorted, in others essential figures have 
been omitted, and in others there has been merely a general 
assertion of the fact of audit without any details of the results of 
audit. Accountants will argue, of course, that they can not foresee 
what a client will do with a report, but in a great many cases the 
accountant may have a fairly indicative premonition. Some 
accountants have adopted the expedient of printing upon each 
sheet of paper a legend to the effect that the report must not be 
used in any way except in its entirety. This would not meet the 
case of the client who simply referred to the fact of audit. There 
is no objection, however, to the adoption of this printed formula 
and in some instances it may be protective.
The second thing which can be done to 
prevent undesirable use of accountants’ 
reports is an effort to educate the banker 
and to teach him not only to ask for audited statements but to 
read them when they are submitted. Some years ago letters of 
inquiry were sent to a number of prominent bankers in a great 
city asking what attention was paid to the details of the state­
ments submitted by borrowers. To the utter astonishment of 
nearly everyone, several bankers admitted that they did not read 
even the accountant’s certificate and were interested merely in 
the name of the accountant. If they knew the name and re­
spected it that was sufficient. In other words, if a well-known 
accounting firm were to certify that the accounts of Blank and 
Company were incomplete, false or misleading and that the com­
pany was insolvent, the banker would not be interested in that 
part of the certificate but would turn merely to the name of the 
signer and conclude that all was well with Blank and Company. 
Can anyone conceive such utter stupidity? And yet that is 
what some bankers themselves admitted. Of course most 
bankers are of a different breed but there are some who can 
not bother with detail. The suggestion of the correspondent 
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bankers that he disclaimed responsibility except when the full 
report was presented does not seem to be a feasible proposal. 
In all probability some of his letters would not be read. A 




It is always pleasant to be able to 
mention the activities of accountants 
which bring them into touch with 
national and public affairs. Only last month we had occasion 
to refer to this subject and we are able to return to it this month. 
Year by year the accomplishments of the profession become 
more and more important to the world. The work which is 
done by public accountants is not measurable in terms of money 
and much of the most important accomplishment is brought about 
simply by the desire to serve. As an illustration of the increas­
ingly significant part which accountants are playing, it is interest­
ing and gratifying to read in the daily papers that Robert H. 
Montgomery of New York has been appointed executive 
secretary of the commission to take profits from war. This 
commission, whose work is timely and gives promise of great 
importance, consists of the secretaries of war, the navy, agricul­
ture, commerce and labor, the attorney-general, Senators Reed, 
Vandenberg, Robinson and Swanson and Representatives Hadley 
of Washington, Holaday of Illinois, Collins of Mississippi and 
McSwain of South Carolina.
As we come up out of the valley of the 
shadow of depression begins a time of 
wider vision. We are all convinced that the worst is past and 
that better days are close at hand. Indeed, most of the bitterness 
of the past months has been fear of a shadow. Business may not 
be greatly improved, but the fear is passing and many are able to 
see through the shadow to the sunlight. One of these people of 
vision writes, “I believe that you have as great an admiration for 
Isaiah as I have. Last night I happened to be reading the 
sixth and seventh verses of the forty-first chapter. Has it oc­
curred to you that these would make a most suitable text for an 
editorial or essay?” Now as it is barely possible that one or 




King James version of these two verses, and as they can not be 
trite even if known by heart, let us quote them:
“They helped everyone his neighbor; and everyone said to his 
brother, Be of good courage.
“So the carpenter encouraged the goldsmith, and he that 
smootheth with the hammer him that smote the anvil saying, 
It is ready for the sodering: and he fastened it with nails, that it 
should not be moved.”
Commentators tell us that these verses really apply to the pro­
cedure of idol-making, but commentators are a troublesome 
folk. Most of us like to take these two splendid examples of 
English and interpret them as we will for a chronicle of brother­
hood. At any rate whatever be the meaning in the original, it 
would be a magnificent thing for all of us to adopt the 
principle involved in the sixth verse at least and help everyone 
his neighbor and say everyone to his brother “Be of good courage.” 
Really there is cause for encouragement.
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